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21 Introduction
The Internet allowed the creation of a new retailing technology: electronic commerce (e-commerce)2. E-
commerce has similarities with catalogue retailing. Without a physical shop, it offers products that cannot be
physically inspected or immediately delivered, and are paid for usually with credit card. But e-commerce also has
unique attributes. The Internet allows to cheaply store, search, and disseminate information; is available anywhere,
anytime, for anyone who can accede to it; allows interactivity; provides perceptual experiences superior to those of a
catalogue, but inferior to those of physical inspection; and serves as a transactions and physical distribution medium
for information goods3. Due to this last aspect, conceivably, it will be in markets for information goods that e-
commerce will have a bigger impact, as the recent evolution of markets for stocks, mortgages, or life insurance
suggests (Bakos et al. (2000), Brown & Goolsbee (2000)).
Four facts have emerged from e-commerce’s short history. First, typically, newly created, purely virtual
firms, adopted e-commerce before established firms. In the book retail industry, new firms like Amazon adopted e-
commerce before old firms like Barnes & Noble, and in the stockbroking retail industry, new firms like E*trade also
adopted e-commerce before old firms like Charles Schwab. Are established firms intrinsically reluctant to adopt e-
commerce? Second, physical shops responded to e-commerce, sometimes by lowering their prices to compete with
virtual shops for consumers that buy on-line; other times they did not lower their prices, and concentrated on selling
only to consumers with Internet access. Charles Schwab lowered the off-line fee from $65 to $30 to match the on-
line fee (New York Times, August 16, 1999), which suggests the first price regime. And in 1999, Barnes & Noble
and Borders matched within hours an Amazon 50% discount on best sellers on their virtual, but not on their physical
shops (The New York Times, May 18, 1999). This suggests that established firms competed for consumers with
Internet access on their virtual shops, but not on their physical shops, i.e., the second price regime. What explains
these price regimes? Third, there is price dispersion on-line. Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999) find that established firms’
virtual shops charge 8.7% more than new firms’ virtual shops, and that on-line the price range is 33% of the average
                                                
2 Transacting products based on the processing and transmission of digitized data over the network of computers that use the transmission control protocol/Internet protocol,
TCP/IP.
3 Goods that can be digitized, i.e., expressed as zeros and ones.
3price4. If supposedly, the Web gives consumers access to perfect information, what explains price dispersion on-line?
Fourth, prices are typically lower on-line. Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999) find that prices average 9-16% less on virtual
shops than on physical shops. Are lower prices intrinsic to e-commerce?
We believe these four facts are related, and develop a static, homogeneous product, partial equilibrium
search model, that explains them in a unified way. The model has three important aspects: e-commerce reduces
consumers’ search costs, involves trade-offs for consumers, and reduces retailing costs. E-commerce reduces
consumers’ search costs, because on the Web consumers can visit at a low cost virtual shops and learn prices5, or
can use shopbots, software agents that automatically search for price information6. E-commerce involves trade-offs
for consumers, because buying from a virtual shop does not require a shopping trip, but requires waiting for delivery.
E-commerce reduces retailing costs, compared to physical shops, because virtual shops allow savings on property
costs, i.e., leases and acquisition of shop and warehouse space, on labor costs, i.e., personnel to attend shops, and on
inventory costs, i.e., inventories for showcasing or immediate delivery7.
In our model, firms decide whether to open virtual shops and set prices, and consumers search for prices.
There are two consumer types: new consumers have Internet access, old consumers do not, or do not consider using
the Internet an option. New consumers canvass prices through the Web, and then decide if they buy from a virtual or
a physical shop. There are two firms: the old firm has a physical shop, the new firm does not. Virtual shops have
lower marginal production costs than physical shops.
Since search and waiting for delivery are costly, new consumers accept prices above the minimum charged
in the market. This gives firms market power.
The virtual shops’ pricing behavior is simple. Virtual shops have the lowest cost and charge the lowest price.
Thus, they are not constrained by consumer search, and charge their monopoly price.
                                                
4 Other empirical studies are: Bailey (1998), Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999), Chevalier & Goolsbee (2000), Clemons, Hann & Hitt (1999), Ellison & Ellison (2001), Friberg,
Ganslandt & Sandstrom (2000), Iyer & Pazgal (2001), Karen, Krishnan, Wolff, & Fernandes (1999), Morton, Zettelmeyer & Risso (2000)).
5 Yahoo Internet Life, August 19 1999, reports that it took 32 minutes to find a hotel in New York using “the old way”, while only 6 minutes using “the net way”.
6 E.g., ClickTheButton, DealPilot , www.previewtravel.com for airfares, and www.microsurf.com for mortgages.
7 On the Web, a banking transaction costs $.1, compared with $.27 at an ATM or $.52 over the phone, and processing an airline ticket costs $1, compared with $8 through a travel
agent (The Economist, June 26, 1999). USA retailers with no physical presence in a state do not collect local sales taxes, 6%.
4The physical shop’s pricing behavior depends of whether the old firm has a virtual shop, and on whether the
new firm is in the market. Because new consumers have access to lower cost shops, and if waiting for delivery is
not too costly, they only accept buying from a physical shop for a lower price than old consumers. When only the
new firm opens a virtual shop, if the physical shop charges a lower price acceptable to both consumer types, it earns
a lower per consumer profit, if it charges a higher price acceptable only to old consumers, it earns a higher per
consumer profit. Thus, the physical shop trades-off volume of sales and per consumer profit; sometimes it chooses
to sell to all consumers, and other times only to old consumers. When both firms open virtual shops, the old firm
faces an additional effect, besides the volume of sales and per consumer profit effects. If its physical shop charges a
lower price acceptable to both consumer types, half of the new consumers it sells to would otherwise buy from the
old firm’s virtual shop, where per consumer profit is higher. This causes the old firm to have its physical shop charge
a lower price to attract new consumers, only if the virtual shops’ cost reduction is small; otherwise it prefers to sell to
new consumers only from its virtual shop. We argue that these price equilibria are different from others in search
theory, where firms face consumers with different reservation prices.
If the new and old firms’ virtual shops have different costs, there will be price dispersion on-line
Since information goods are more convenient to buy on-line, physical shops must charge lower prices than
virtual shops to be able to sell them to new consumers.
The firms’ incentives to open virtual shops depend on the virtual shops' cost reduction, and the new
consumers’ reservation price. If cost reduction is small, the new firm has more incentives to open a virtual shop; if
cost reduction is large, and the new consumers’ reservation price is high, this is no longer true. In fact, the old firm
can choose to open a virtual shop when the new firm does not.
The model has two novel features. First, it captures some of the consumers’ and firms’ trade-offs regarding
e-commerce. Second, the production and the search cost distributions are endogenous.
Section 2 presents the basic model, where reservation prices are exogenous, and section 3 characterizes its
equilibria. Section 4 discusses the firms’ incentives to open virtual shops. Section 5 allows the new and old firm to
operate the new technology at different costs. Section 6 presents the model with endogenous reservation prices.
5Section 7 discusses price equilibria for information goods. Section 8 discusses related literature. Proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
In this section we formalize the firms’ opening of a virtual shop and pricing decisions, given consumers’
reservation prices, as a 2 stage game. Later we will insert this Basic model in a larger game that includes a third
stage, where reservation prices are determined.
(a) The Setting
Consider a retail market for a homogeneous search good that opens for 1 period.
There are 2 alternative retailing technologies8: a New, virtual shop based technology, and an Old, physical
shop based technology. A Virtual Shop has a Web site, where consumers can observe prices and buy, and its
logistics is based on the Web. A Physical Shop has a physical location, where consumers can observe prices and
buy, and its logistics is based on the physical world. A physical shop may have a Web site, but only to post prices9. A
firm is Old if it has a physical shop, opened before the game, and New if it does not.
The game has 2 stages. In stage 1 firms choose whether to open virtual shops. In stage 2 firms choose
prices. Then consumers buy, delivery takes place, agents receive their payoffs, and the market closes.
Subscript j refers to firms and we index a new and an old firm by:   n,o . Subscripts t refers to shops and we
index a new firm’s virtual shop, an old firm’s virtual shop, and a physical shop by:   vn,vo, p .
(b) Consumers
There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral consumers of 2 types. New consumers, a proportion
  
l Î 0 ,1( ], have Internet access; Old consumers do not. At price p a consumer demands   D(p), where     D (.)  is a
differentiable, decreasing, bounded function, with a bounded inverse.
Consumers ignore the prices of individual shops, and can only learn them by visiting the shops. Old
consumers visit the physical shop’s physical location, and if offered a price no higher than   r , where   D(r) º0 , buy
                                                
8 Technologies that make products available for use or consumption. This concept is related to that of a distribution channel (see Kotler (1994)).
6and receive the product. When there are no virtual shops, new consumers behave similarly. Otherwise new
consumers canvass prices through the Web10. They have the list of Web sites, obtained, e.g., from a search engine,
but do not know to which type of shop the directions correspond. At the end of section 6 we explain the role of the
assumptions that consumers do not know beforehand to which type of shops the Web sites correspond, that the
physical shop has a Web site, and that when there are virtual shops, new consumers canvass prices through the
Web. We assume that:
(H.1) Each new consumers picks randomly which Web site to visit, from the set he has not sampled yet.
The new consumers’ reservation price for a type t shop is   rt . When new consumers visit a new (old) firm’s virtual
shop, if offered a price no higher than   rvn  (  rvo ), they buy, and wait for delivery; when they visit a physical shop’s
Web site, if offered a price no higher than   rp , they go to the shop’s physical location, buy, and receive the product;
otherwise they reject the offer and search again11. Visiting a Web site or a physical shop’s physical location, and
waiting for delivery of the product bought from a virtual shop, involve costs which we will ignore until section 6.
(c) Firms
There are 2 risk neutral firms: a new and an old firm. If the new firm decides not to open a virtual shop, it
exits the game with a 0 payoff. Opening a virtual shop involves a set-up cost, 
  
K Î 0,+¥( ). The probability with
which firm j opens a virtual shop is   aj ; let   
a = a n ,ao( ). At the end of stage 1   a  is observed by all players. If at least
1 virtual shop opens, the physical shop creates its own Web site, where it posts its price.
Marginal production costs are constant for both shop types. The marginal cost of shop t is   ct . A virtual shop
has a lower marginal cost than a physical shop. Let 
  
cp Î 0 ,r( ) and   cvn = cvo = cv = c p - Dc , where   cp  is the common
                                                                                                                                                    
9 Bailey (1998) and Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999) found that, e.g., Cody’s and Powell’s Books, posted prices on the Web, but only sold at their physical locations.
10 In 2000, about half of the US car buyers will use the Internet. Most of them not to buy, but to obtain information to bargain lower prices out of local dealers (The Economist,
February 14, 1998).
11 As an alternative to sequential search new consumers could use shopbots. Shopbots give consumers a sample of between 20 to 40 prices at a low fixed search cost. Thus,
although they to not give consumers perfect information, or necessarily identify the lowest price, contrary to popular belief, shopbots can be approximated by a newspaper search
technology (Braverman (1980), Salop & Stiglitz (1977), Wilde & Schwartz (1979)), i.e., perfect information at a fixed cost. The firms’ trade-offs, between selling to only to high
search cost consumers, or selling to high and to low search cost consumers, or between using only one retail technologies, or using both, remain qualatatively the same in this
alternative setting, except that price equilibrium would be in mixed strategies.
7production cost, and 
  
D c Î 0,c p( ] is the production cost reduction induced by the new technology. All players know
  
c p ,cv( ).
The old firm can charge different prices at its 2 shops12. Shop t’s price and per consumer profit are   pt  and
  p ( pt ;ct ) := ( pt - ct)D( pt ) . Let     
) 
p t := ar gmax p  p ( p ; c t ) . Assume that   p(.)  is strictly quasi-concave in p, and that
even for the maximum cost reduction the physical shop can charge   
) 
p v  without losses, i.e.,   
cp <
) 
p v  for   Dc = cp .
Shop t’s expected consumer share and expected profit are:   ft (pt ) and     P ( p t ; ct ) := p( p t ; ct ) ft ( pt ) . The new and
old firm’s net expected profits are: 
    
V n := P ( p vn ; cv ) - K[ ]a n  and 
    
V o := P ( p p ; c p ) + P ( p vo ; cv )[ -K ]a o.
A firm’s stage 1 strategy, is a rule that for every firm type, says with which probability a firm should open a
virtual shop. A firm’s stage 2 strategy, is a rule that for each history and shop type, says which price a shop should
charge. A firm's payoff is expected profit, net of the investment expenditure.
(d) Equilibrium
A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is: an opening and a pricing rule, for each shop and firm type,
   
a j
* , p t
*( )j = n, o ;  t = vn , vo , p{ }, such that:
(E.1) Given any   rt  and a, firms choose   pt
*  to solve problems: 
  
max pvn  V
n  and 
    
max { p vo , p p}  V
o ;
(E.2) Given any   rt , and   pt
* , firms choose 
  
aj
*  to solve problem: 
  
maxa j V
j .
3 Equilibrium of the Basic Model
In this section we construct the basic model’s equilibrium by working backwards. First, given reservation
prices and the profile of opening of virtual shops decisions, we derive the firms' equilibrium prices. Virtual shops
charge their monopoly price. The physical shop charges sometimes the new consumers’ reservation price, other
times its monopoly price. Second, given reservation prices and equilibrium prices, we derive the firms’ equilibrium
opening of virtual shop’s rule. Either firm sometimes opens a virtual shop, sometimes does not. There are 6 types of
                                                
12 Barnesandnoble.com charges different prices than Barnes and Noble’s physical shops.
8equilibria, depending on whether firms choose to open a virtual shop, and whether the physical shop sells to all or only
to old consumers.
3.1 Stage 2: The Price Game
In this sub-section we characterize equilibrium prices.
The number of shops that charge a price acceptable to new consumers, i.e.,   pt £ rt ,   t= vn,vo, p , is a . If
virtual shop   t charges a price higher than   rt , it makes no sales; if it charges a price no higher than   rt , given (H.1)
and that there is a continuum of new consumers, its expected consumer share is   l / a . Thus, for   0 < a :
  
f t (p ;r t ) =
0     Ü  rt < p
l/a Ü  p £ rt
    t = vn, vo
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
(we omit a  and l  in   ft ).
If the physical shop charges a price higher than   r , it makes no sales; if it charges a price higher than   rp , but
no higher than   r , it sells to old consumers,   1- l ; if it charges a price no higher than the   rp , its expected consumer
share is   l / a + 1- l . Thus, for   0 < a :
  
f p(p ;r p) =
0                 Ü  r < p       
1-l            Ü  r p < p £ r
l/a + 1-l  Ü  p £ rp      
ì 
í 
ï 
î 
ï ï 
(we omit a , l  and   r  in   fp ).
We assume that 
  
rp <
) 
p p , which rules out the uninteresting cases, where although virtual shops exist, the
physical shop is able to sell to new consumers at 
  
) 
p p , its monopoly price. We assume also that   rt  is strictly higher
than the lowest of the prices consumers can find if they search:
(H.2) 
  
min p ¢ t { }< rt   ¢ t ¹ t
9This assumption rules out equilibria which are not subgame perfect in the larger model, if search and waiting for
delivery are costly. It follows that costly search and impatience give firms market power13, since they lead new
consumers to accept prices above the minimum charged in the market. By (H.2),   0 < a .
When neither firm opens a virtual shop, 
  
a = 0 , 0( ), the industry is a monopoly. The number of shops that
charge a price acceptable to new consumers when firms play 
  
an , ao( ) in stage 1 is   a a n a o ;   a 00 = 1 .
Next we examine the case where only the new firm opens a virtual shop, and hence the industry’s supply
side consists of the physical shop, and the new firm’s virtual shop. The value of 
  
rp  for which the old firm is
indifferent between charging   p p = rp , and charging   p p =
) 
p p , given   
a = 1 , 0( ) and   pvn £ rvn , is   pos , i.e.
   
p (p o
s
( l); c p ) l/ 2 + 1 - l[ ]ºp () p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ). We assume that when the old firm is indifferent between selling to both
consumers types and selling only to old consumers, it chooses the latter.
Proposition 1: If 
  
a = 1 , 0( ), then: (i)    pvn* = ) p v ; (ii)
  
pp
* =
rp   Ü   p os ( l) < rp
) 
p p   Ü   rp £ po
s (l)
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
where   po
s(.) is decreasing, and 
  
po
s(1) = c p . §
Since the new firm’s virtual shop charges the lowest price in the market, and given (H.2), it is never
constrained by consumer search and always charges   
) 
p v . The physical shop also benefits from the market power
generated by costly search, and from being the only shop old consumers can buy from, by charging a higher price
than the new firm’s virtual shop. However, it is constrained by consumer search, if it is beneficial to sell to both
consumer types14. Let 
  
) 
l ( r p ) := (p o
s )
-1 ( rp ) . If   rp  is high, i.e.,   po
s( l ) < rp , or alternatively, if l  is large, i.e.,
  
) 
l ( r p ) < l , the old firm wants to sell to both consumers types, so reduces its price below   
) 
p p  and charges   rp  (figure
1). If   rp  is low, i.e.,   rp < po
s ( l ) , or alternatively, if l  is small, i.e.,   l <
) 
l ( rp ) , the old firm wants to sell only to old
                                                
13 The ability to raise price above marginal cost.
14 And the threat of a second search by new consumers is credible, i.e., 
   
rp <
) 
p p .
10
consumers and charges 
  
) 
p p .15 The higher is l , the more willing is the physical shop to lower its price to sell to new
consumers. From Proposition 1:
  
a10 = 2  
Ü   p o
s
(l) < rp
1  Ü   rp £ po
s
(l)
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
When the old firm does not open a virtual shop and charges   rp  instead of   
) 
p p , it sells to   l / 2  new
consumers, earning an additional 
    
p ( r p ; c p ) l / 2( ), the Volume of Sales effect, but loses    - p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ]
per old consumer, and a total of 
   
- p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ]1 - l( ), the per Consumer Profit effect. Thus, the physical
shop trades-off volume of sales and per consumer profit16.
[Insert figure 1 here]
When the physical shop charges 
  
rp , new consumers search only once17; otherwise new consumers may
search twice, until they find the virtual shop.
When only the new firm opens a virtual shop there can be 2 types of price equilibria. In both the virtual shop
charges   
) 
p v . The physical shop at a Competing equilibrium charges   rp , and at a Segmentation equilibrium charges
  
) 
p p . The Competing equilibrium occurs when   rp ,l( ) are large, and the Segmentation equilibrium occurs when
  
rp ,l( ) are small.
Next we examine the case where both firms open virtual shops, and hence the industry’s supply side
consists of a physical shop and 2 virtual shops. The level of   rp  for which the old firm is indifferent between its
physical shop selling to both consumer types, and selling only to old consumers, given 
  
a = 1, 1( ) and   pt £ rt ,
  t= vn,vo , is   pm
s , i.e., 
   
p (
) 
p v ; cv ) l/ 3( )+ p(p ms ( l,Dc ); c p ) l/ 3 + 1 - l[ ]º p() p v ; cv ) l/ 2( )+ p( ) p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ). We assume
that when the old firm is indifferent between its physical shop charging   p p = rp , and charging   p p =
) 
p p , it chooses
                                                
15 When   rp < p p
*
 the physical shop could shut its Web site.
16 The physical shop could price discriminate between new and old consumers, by, e.g., offering coupons at its Web site. It might, however, be reluctant to do so, because when
informed about them, old consumers could perceive these price differences as unfair. See Sinha (2000) for a discussion of this issue.
17 The option to search serves only as a credible, out of equilibrium threat, constraining the old firm’s price decisions.
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the latter; and that for     Dc = c p ,    2 < p (
) 
p v ; cv )/ p(
) 
p p ; c p ) , which can be interpreted as the Large Cost Reduction
Opportunities case. The value of   Dc  for which    p (
) 
p v ; cv )/ p (
) 
p p ; c p ) º 2 , is   Dc
c .18
Proposition 2: If 
  
a = 1, 1( ), then: (i)     pvn* = p vo* = ) p v ; (ii)
   
p p
* =
   
) 
p p                                   for  D c Î Dc
c , c p[ ]
rp   Ü   p m
s (l ,Dc ) <r p
) 
p 
p
  Ü  rp £p m
s (l, Dc )
 for  Dc Î 0, Dc
c( )
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
where   pm
s (.)  is decreasing in l , increasing in   Dc ,   po
s( l ) < pm
s ( l, Dc ) , and   
pm
s ( l ,Dc ) Î c p ,
) 
p p( ). §
Note that     pvn
* = p vo
* =
) 
p v  is an expression of Diamond’s (1971) paradox19. From Proposition 2:
    
a11 =
2                                  for  Dc Î Dc
c , cp[ ]
3  Ü   p m
s (l, Dc ) < rp
2  Ü   r p £ p m
s (l,D c )
 for  Dc Î 0, D c
c( ) 
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
When the old firm opens a virtual shop, it faces another per Consumer Profit effect, now with respect to
new consumers, besides the Volume of Sales effect, 
  
p (rp ; c p )  l /6( ), and the previous per Consumer Profit effect
with respect to old consumers, 
   
- p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p (rp ; c p )[ ] 1 - l( ). If its physical shop charges   rp  instead of   
) 
p p , half
of the new consumers it sells to,     l / 6 , would otherwise buy from its own virtual shop, causing a loss of
   
- p (
) 
p v ; c v ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ]l/6( ). This additional effect causes the old firm to only want to reduce its physical shop’s
price below 
  
) 
p p  to attract new consumers, if cost reduction is small, i.e.,   Dc £ Dc
c . Otherwise, the old firm prefers to
sell to new consumers only from its virtual shop. And when the old firm’s physical shop does reduce its price to
attract new consumers, it does so for higher reservation price values than when it does not open a virtual shop,
  po
s < p m
s  (figure 2). Even when all consumers have Internet access,   l = 1 , if cost reduction is small, and   pm
s < rp ,
the old firm still sells from the physical shop, 
  pm
s (1,D c )<
) 
p p , since this allows it to have a new consumer share of
  2l/3  instead of   l/ 2 .
                                                
18  Price   
) 
p v  depends on   cv , and thus on   Dc . If    2 < p(
) 
p v ; cv)/ p (
) 
p p ; cp ) ,   D c
c
£ c p , whereas if    p (
) 
p v; cv )/ p (
) 
p p ; c p ) £ 2 ,   D c
c
= c p .
12
[Insert figure 2 here]
When both firms open virtual shops there is a Competing and a Segmentation equilibrium. A Competing
equilibrium, exists when   Dc  is small and   rp ,l( ) are large, and a Segmentation equilibrium exists when either   Dc
takes intermediate values and 
  
rp ,l( ) are small, or when   Dc  is large.
The price equilibria of case 
  
a = 1,1( ) are different from other search theory equilibria where firms must
choose whether to sell only to high reservation price consumers, or to sell also to low reservation price consumers
(e.g., Braverman (1980), Burdett & Judd (1983), Rob (1985), Salop & Stiglitz (1977), Varian (89), Wilde &
Schwartz (1979)), because the old firm’s problem is not just whether to sell to low reservation price consumers, but
also how to sell to them, since it can do so either through its virtual or its physical shop.
Next we examine the case where only the old firm opens a virtual shop, and hence the industry’s supply side
consists of the old firm’s physical and virtual shops.
Proposition 3: If 
  
a = 0 , 1( ), then: (i)    p vo* = ) p v ; (ii)    p p* =
) 
p p . §
Now since the old firm is alone in the industry, it has no incentive to reduce its physical shop’s price below
  
) 
p p . Any new consumer its physical shop might attract is stolen from its virtual shop, where per consumer profit is no
smaller. And, if all consumers have Internet access,   l = 1 , since   rp <
) 
p p , the physical shop has zero sales, which
could be interpreted as Shutting Down. From Proposition 3:   a
01 = 1 .
When only the old firm opens a virtual shop there is a Segmentation equilibrium.
Table 1 summarizes the price equilibria’s main features.
[Insert table 1 here]
                                                                                                                                                    
19 Low cost shops charge their monopoly price, regardless of how low the search cost is, and how many shops there are. See Davis & Holt (1996) for experimental evidence.
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Next we order the equilibrium price distributions for the various stage 1 decision profiles. The market
equilibrium price distribution when in stage 1 firms play 
  
an , ao( ) is   F a nao (.) ;    F' (.) p F (.)  means “distribution     F (.)
dominates distribution     F ' (.)  in the first-order stochastic sense”.
20
Proposition 4: (i)   F10 p F01 p F 0 0 ; (ii)   F11 p F01 §
Since   F00  dominates all other distributions, if at least 1 virtual shop opens, prices fall due to 2 effects. The
Cost Reduction effect, is the fall on prices caused by the production cost reduction induced by e-commerce. The
Price Competition effect, is the fall on prices induced by the physical shop lowering its price to compete for new
consumers with the new firm’s virtual shop. If the new firm opens a virtual shop prices fall, since   F10 p F00  and
  F
11 p F01 . If the old firm opens a virtual shop, prices only fall for sure if it is the only virtual shop,   F
01 p F 00 . When
the new firm opens a virtual shop, the old firm opening a virtual shop puts more weight on the left tail of the price
distribution. But since   po
s £ p m
s , the physical shop charges a no lower price than when it has no virtual shop. Thus,
  F11 and   F10  are not comparable in the first-order stochastic sense.
3.2 Stage 1: The Opening of Virtual Shops Game
In this sub-section we characterize the equilibrium opening rule and establish existence of equilibrium.
Firm j’s net profit when in stage 1 firms play 
  
an , ao( ), and after both firms and consumers play optimally is
  
V
a n ao
j . The difference between firm j’s net profits when it opens a virtual shop, and when it does not, given that firm
j plays     d = 0 , 1  in stage 1 is     D1|d
j , e.g.,   D1|1
o =V11
o -V1 0
o  and   D1|1
n =V11
n -V0 1
n =V11
n . Firm j’s Expected Incremental
Profit of opening a virtual shop is 
   
S j := a ¢ j D1|1
j + 1 - a ¢ j ( )D1|0j ,   ¢ j ¹ j .
Firm j’s optimal stage 1 decision is to open a virtual shop if its expected incremental profit is positive.
Proposition 5: Equilibrium exists. §
                                                
20 Distribution    F (.)  Dominates distribution    ¢ F (.)  in the First-Order Stochastic sense if   F(.) £ ¢ F (.) , for all p.
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Given the range of values the   S j ’s can take, virtually any profile of decisions to open a virtual shop can be
an equilibrium. In section 4 we describe equilibrium profiles for particular cases.
4 Incentives to Open Virtual Shops
In this section we discuss the firms’ incentives to open virtual shops. We show that if cost reduction is small,
the new firm opens a virtual shop when the old firm does, and also when the old firm does not; otherwise the old firm
may open a virtual shop when the new firm does not.
We start by discussing how opening a virtual shop impacts the new and old firms’ profits. Since the new firm
has no physical shop, opening a virtual shop enables it to sell to new consumers. The Business Creating effect, is
the increase in the new firm’s profit from opening a virtual shop, 
  
p (
) 
p v ; c v ) l/a( ). The impact of opening a virtual
shop on the old firm’s profit can be decomposed in 3 effects. The old firm can sell to new consumers through its
physical shop. But, if it opens a virtual shop it can sell to them at a lower cost. The Cost Reduction effect, is the
increase in the old firm’s profit from selling to new consumers through its virtual shop, instead of its physical shop,
  
p (
) 
p v ; cv ) - p( p p
* ; c p )[ ]l/mc( ), where   l/mc  is the proportion of new consumers that buy from the old firm’s virtual
shop, but that would buy from the physical shop if the old firm did not open a virtual shop. By opening a virtual shop
when the new firm also does, the old firm improves its ability to sell to new consumers. The Market Penetration
effect, is the increase in the old firm’s profit, due to the rise in its new consumers’ share, from opening a virtual shop
when the new firm also does, 
  
p (
) 
p v ; c v ) l/m p( ), where   l/m p  is the proportion of new consumers that buy from the
old firm’s virtual shop, but that would buy from the new firm’s virtual shop if the old firm did not open a virtual shop.
By opening a virtual shop when the new firm also does, the old firm can sell to new consumers through its virtual
shop, and have its physical shop sell only to old consumers. The Price Discrimination effect, is the increase in the
old firm’s profit from switching from a Competing to a Segmentation equilibrium, 
  
p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ]1 - l( ).21
                                                
21 The Cost Reduction effect is present in   D 1|0
o
, and in   D 1|1
o
 if   po
s £ r p ; the Market Penetration effect is present in   D 1|1
o
 if   rp < po
s  for   D c
c < D c , and if    
rp Ï p o
s , p m
s[ ) for
  D c £ Dc
c
; the Price Discrimination effect is present in   D 1|1
o
 if   po
s
£ r p  for   D c
c
< D c , and if    
rp Î p o
s , p m
s[ ) for   D c £ Dcc .
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The next lemma orders the firms incremental payoffs. The value of   Dc  for which    p (
) 
p v ; cv )/ p (
) 
p p ; c p ) º 3/2 ,
is    
) 
D c ( 3 /2) .
Lemma 1: (i) If 
   
Dc Î 0 ,
) 
D c ( 3/2 )( ), then     D1|0o <V11n , and thus    max D1|0o , D1|1o{ }< V11n £ V10n . (ii) If   pos( l ) < rp  and
    
Dc Î Dc
c , c p( ], then     V11n =V1 0n <D1|0o , and thus     D1|1o <V1 0n < D1|0o . (iii)    
) 
D c (3 /2 ) < Dc
c . §
Since the new firm’s consumer share is no bigger when the old firm opens a virtual shop than when it does
not:   V11
n £V10
n . When both firms open a virtual shop, the Business Creating effect dominates the Market
Penetration, Cost Reduction and Price Discrimination effects:     D1|1
o £ V1 1
n , and thus     D1|1
o £ V1 1
n £V1 0
n .
Expression   V1d
n -D1|0
o ,     d = 0 , 1 , equals the difference between the Business Creating and the Cost
Reduction effects. If   Dc  is small, i.e.,    D c <
) 
D c ( 3/2 ) , the Business Creating effect dominates the Cost Reduction
effect,     D1|0
o
< V1 1
n , and thus: 
   
max D1|0
o
, D1|1
o{ }< V11n £ V10n . If, however,   Dc  is large, i.e.,   Dcc < Dc , and the physical shop
competes for new consumers, i.e., 
  
po
s( l ) < rp  or alternatively   
) 
l ( r p ) < l , the Cost Reduction effect dominates the
Business Creating effect,     V10
n < D1|0
o . Furthermore, for 
   
a = 1 , 0( ) the model has a Competing equilibrium, and for
  
a = 1,1( ) a Segmentation equilibrium. Thus,   V11n =V1 0n , and consequently:     D1|1o <V1 1n =V10n <D1|0o .
Next we characterize the opening of virtual shops equilibrium profiles, for Lemma 1’s 2 cases. To focus on
pure strategy equilibria, we assume that when a firm is indifferent between opening and not opening a virtual shop it
chooses the former22. We assume also that 
   
0 £ max D1|0o , V10n{ }, which rules out     a* = 0 , 0( ). Let   w := l ,c p ,D c ,K ,rp( )
Proposition 6: (i) If
    
Dc Î 0 ,
) 
D c ( 3/2 )( ), then:
  
a* =
1,0( ) Ü  w | D1|1o < 0{ }
1,1( ) Ü  w |0 £ D1|1o{ }
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
                                                
22 Although Proposition 6 is not exhaustive, an equilibrium in pure strategies does exist for all parameter values. See Mazón & Pereira (2001a).
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(ii) If 
  
po
s( l ) < rp  and 
    
Dc Î Dc
c , c p( ], then:
  
a* =
0,1( )  Ü   w | V10n < 0 £D1|0o{ }
1,0( )  Ü   w | D1|1o < 0 £ V10n{ } 
1,1( )  Ü   w | 0 £ D1|1o{ }          
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
§
If   Dc  is small, the new firm opens a virtual shop when the old firm does, and also when the old firm does not:
    D1|1
o < 0 . We interpret this as the old firm having less incentive to open a virtual shop.
[Insert figure 3 here]
For 
   
l,Dc( )Î 0 , ) l c ( rp )( )´ 0 , ) D c( 3/2 )( ),     D1|1o  and   V10n  are increasing in   l ,Dc ,( ), and decreasing in   K  (figure 3
(i)). If 
  
l , Dc( ) are small,     D1|1o < 0 £ V10n , and thus   a
* = 1,0( ); for larger values of   l , Dc( ),     0 £ D1|1
o , and thus
  
a* = 1,1( ). Although the model is static, this could explain why typically new firms opened virtual shops before old
firms. Initially, 
  
l , Dc( ) were small because few consumers had Internet access, and firms did not fully understand the
new technology. Overtime, more consumers gained access to the Internet, and firms learned how to use the new
technology.
If however, 
  
l , Dc( ) are large, the old firm may open a virtual shop when the new firm does not:
  V10
n < 0 £ D1|0
o .
For 
   
l,Dc( )Î
) 
l c ( rp ) ,1( ]´ Dcc , cp( ],     D1|0o ,     D1|1o , and   V10n , are increasing in   l , Dc( ), and decreasing in   K  (figure
3: (ii)). If 
  
l , Dc( ) are larger than 
    
) 
l c ( rp ),Dc
c( ) but not by much,   V10n < 0 £ D1|0o , and thus   a* = 0,1( ); for larger values
of 
  
l , Dc( ), again     0 £ D1|1o , and thus   a
* = 1,1( ).
The model shows how the old firm might have less incentive to open a virtual shop if cost reduction is small.
But, if cost reduction is large, the old firm need not have less incentive. In fact, it can choose to open a virtual shop
when the new firm does not.
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It has been claimed that an old firm may be reluctant to use e-commerce for fear of its virtual shop, with
supposedly a lower per consumer profit, stealing business from its physical shop, i.e., Self-Cannibalization23. Note
first that cannibalization is part of the Cost Reduction effect. If a virtual shop has lower costs than a physical shop,
and market power, this intra-firm transfer of new consumers is profitable 24. Second, if an old firm opens a virtual
shop it can increase its new consumers’ share, Market Penetration effect, and price discriminate between new and
old consumers, Price Discrimination effect, both of which are also profitable 25. In the next section we add some
comments on this issue.
5 Firm Asymmetry
In this section, we discuss how a possible asymmetry between the new and old firm with respect to the new
technology, affects the firms’ pricing behavior and incremental profits.
We assumed that the new and old firm are equally capable of achieving the new technology’s cost
reduction. However, if virtual shops require new forms of organization that take advantage of the new technology’s
low cost of information processing and transmission, if integrating virtual and physical shop retailing is hard, and if old
firms’ employees resist the new technology because it devalues their skills, the new firm might achieve larger
retailing cost reductions than the old firm. To model this asymmetry let 
  cvo
= c p -   1 -e( )D c , where   e Î 0,1[ ]
measures the efficiency loss of the old firm relative to the new firm.
The firms’ pricing behavior remains unchanged, except for 
  
a = 1,1( ), where 
  
pvo
* = min rvo ,
) 
p vo{ },
  
) 
p vo Î
) 
p v ,
) 
p p[ ). This implies that there may be price dispersion among virtual shops26.
Now     D1|0
o <V11
n , if   Dc  is small, or, if   Dc  is large but e  is also large (figure 4). And     V10
n < D1|0
o , if   Dc  is large
and e  is small. And for e  large enough     D1|0
o
< V1 1
n  for all values of   Dc .
[Insert figure 4 here]
                                                
23 Toys”R”Us invested $80 million to launch a virtual division, but Robert Mogg, the man in charge, resigned, claiming that the firm was afraid of competing with its own physical
shops (El País, September 5, 1999). Alba et al. (1997): “E-commerce offers an advantage to retailers that have low penetration (…). On the other hand, companies with high
penetration might experience significant cannibalization of its in-shop sales, making e-commerce less attractive”.
24 Baseball Express, claims that its Web site stole sales from its catalogue, but that selling on the Web is more profitable (The New York Times, September, 2, 1999).
25 Ward & Morganosky (2000) and Ward (1999) also arrive to a negative conclusion on cannibalization, although for different reasons.
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The Cost Reduction effect becomes 
  
p min rvo ,
) 
p vo{ }; cvo( )-p p p* ; cp( )[ ]l/mc( ), which can be negative if   rvo
is small and   cvo  large, giving some justification to the fear of Self-Cannibalization. The Market Penetration effect
  
p min rvo ,
) 
p v o{ }; cv o( )l/m p( ) also becomes smaller.
6 Endogenous Reservation Prices
In this section we add to the model, a third stage where reservation prices are determined, given consumers’
search and waiting costs. The game consists of 3 stages. The first 2 unfold as in the basic model. In stage 3
consumers make their search and purchase decisions; then delivery takes place, agents receive their payoffs, and the
market closes.
To complete the model we introduce the following costs. Visiting the physical shop involves cost,
  
s Î 0 ,+¥( ), which includes the opportunity cost of the time spent, and associated expenses like driving. Visiting a
Web site involves cost, s - Ds , which includes the opportunity cost of the time spent, and associated expenses like
phone calls and Internet fees, and where, 
  
Ds Î 0 ,s( ), is the search cost reduction induced by the new technology.
Waiting for delivery of a product bought from a virtual shop involves cost, d , that results from deferring
consumption. Searching Web sites is instantaneous, a consumer may observe any number of prices, and may at any
time accept any offer received to date. Let 
    
S( p ) := D ( t) d tp
¥
ò . The surplus of a consumer that buys from a type t
shop at price   pt , is     S( p t ) - ut , where   ut = s  if   t= p , and   ut = d  if   t= vn,vo . Let   DS := S(
) 
p v ) - S(
) 
p p ).
Old consumers, and new consumers when 
  
a = 0 ,0( ), visit the physical shop, and if offered a price   p £ r  buy
and receive the product, getting a surplus of   S(p) - s . When   
a ¹ 0,0( ), new consumers first visit a Web site chosen
at random: (H.1).27 Then, they decide if they accept the best offer at hand and terminate search; or if they reject it,
retaining the option to recall it later, and visit one of the other shop’s Web sites. If new consumers have visited all
shops, they accept the offer with the highest surplus.
                                                                                                                                                    
26 See Baye & Morgan (2000) and Ayer & Pazgal (2000) for alternative ways of generating price dispersion on-line.
27 This first step is usually absent in the search literature since it is assumed that consumers get their first price observation for free.
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A consumer's information set just after his k-th search step consists of all previously observed prices. A
consumer’s stage 3 strategy,   s , is a stopping rule, that for any sequence of observations, says if search should stop
or continue. A consumer's payoff is the expected consumer surplus, net of the search expenditure.
A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is: a stopping rule for new consumers, and an opening and a pricing
rule, for each shop and firm type, 
   
a j
* , p t
* , s*( ) j = n, o; t = vn , vo , p{ }, such that:
(E.0) Given any a and   pt , new consumers choose   s
*  to maximize net expected surplus;
(E.1) Given any a, and   s* , firms choose   pt
*  to solve problems: 
  
max pvn  V
n  and 
   
max { p vo , p p}  V
o ;
(E.2) Given   s*  and   pt
* , firms choose 
  
aj
*  to solve problem: 
  
maxa j V
j .
Next we characterize the new consumers equilibrium search behavior for 
  
a ¹ 0,0( ).
When 
  
a = 1,0( ), 0 ,1( ), new consumers’ search may involve 3 steps. In step 3, consumers know both prices,
and the optimal strategy is to accept   pt , if   S(pt ) - ut ³ S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t . In step 2, a consumer who was offered   pt  at the
shop he choose to visit at random in step 1, gains 
  
S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S(p t ) + u t[ ] by searching. Search is optimal if and only
if 
  
s - Ds < S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S(p t ) + u t[ ]. Let   rt a na o  equate the marginal search cost, s - Ds , to the marginal benefit,
when firms play 
  
an , ao( ) in stages 1:
  
S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S(rt
a na o ) + u t[ ]= s - Ds   ¢ t ¹ t (1)
The new consumers’ optimal search rule is to accept offer   pt  and terminate search, if   pt £ rt
a n a o , and reject offer
  pt  and proceed to step 3, if   pt > rt
a n a o .28 Equation (1) defines implicitly reservation price function,   rt
a na o = Rt
a n a o( .),
which is increasing in   p ¢ t . Also,   Rt
a
n
a
o (p p ,s ,Ds ,d ) ,   t= vn,vo , are increasing in s , and decreasing in Ds  and d , and
  
Rp
an ao (p t ,Ds ,d ) ,   t= vn,vo , is increasing in d , and decreasing in Ds . It is straightforward to show that the maximum
price for which new consumers accept the physical shop’s offer in step 3, is strictly smaller than 
  
rp
1 0 . Thus the
                                                
28 See Reinganum (1979) or Benabou (1993).
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physical shop cannot charge a price higher than 
  
rp
1 0 , expecting that it will be rejected in step 2, but accepted in step 3.
If   pvn
* = p vo
* ,   rvn
1 0 = rvo
0 1 .
The next lemma establishes the parameter restrictions required for   rp
a na o <
) 
p p  and (H.2).
Lemma 2: (i) If Ds < d , then   p t < rp
a n a o ,   t= vn,vo . (ii) If d < 2s - Ds , then   p p < rt
a n a o ,   t= vn,vo . (iii) If
  d < DS + Ds , then   rp
a na o <
) 
p p . §
From Lemma 2: (i)-(ii), (H.2) follows from search and waiting for delivery being costly. Since new
consumers have access to lower cost shops, and from Lemma 2: (iii), if waiting for delivery is not too costly, new
consumers only accept buying from the physical shop for a lower price than old consumers: 
  
rp <
) 
p p < r . From now
on let 
  
d Î Ds , Ds +min DS,2 s - Ds( ){ }( ).
When 
  
a = 1,1( ), new consumers’ search may consist of 4 steps. Steps 3 and 4 are similar to steps 2 and 3 of
the previous 2 cases. In step 2, there are 2 Web sites to sample. Let   S(p ¢ ¢ t ) -u ¢ ¢ t < S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t . If
  S(pt ) - ut < S(p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t , a new consumer who is offered   pt , gains   S(p ¢ t 
) - u ¢ t - S(p t ) + u t[ ] by sampling shop   ¢ t ,
and gains 
  
S(p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t - S( p t ) + ut[ ] by sampling shop   ¢ ¢ t . If   S(p ¢ ¢ t ) -u ¢ ¢ t £ S(p t ) - u t < S(p ¢ t ) -u ¢ t , new consumers’
expect to gain 
  
S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S(p t ) + u t[ ]/2  by searching, since they reject shop   ¢ ¢ t ’s offer. The optimal search rule is
to hold reservation price   rt
1 1  which equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost:
  
1
2
S( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t -S( rt
11 ) + u t[ ]+ 12 S( p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t -S( rt11 ) + u t[ ]= s - Ds   Ü   S( rt 11 ) -u t < S(p ¢ ¢ t ) -u ¢ ¢ t 
1
2
S( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t -S( r t
11) + u
t[ ]= s -D s                              Ü   S( p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t £ S( rt1 1 ) -ut < S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
(2)
Equation (2) also defines implicitly reservation price function,   Rt
11(.), which is non-decreasing in   p ¢ t  and   p ¢ ¢ t . As
before, it is straightforward to show that the maximum price for which new consumers accept the physical shop’s
offer, is smaller in step t  than in step t + 1 , t = 2, 3 . Lemma 2 holds, and if 
  
s < S(
) 
p p ) + Ds( )/ 2 , in equilibrium
consumers always have a strictly positive net surplus.
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Equilibrium prices are as in section 3 and Proposition 5 holds.
We conclude this section by explaining the role of the assumptions that consumers do not know beforehand
to which type of shops the Web sites correspond, that the physical shop has a Web site, and that when there are
virtual shops, new consumers must canvass prices through the Web. In Reinganum (1979) and Benabou (1993),
firms have different costs, play pure strategies, and consumers do not know the firms’ costs c. Thus, although
consumers know the firms’ equilibrium price rule   p
*( .), they do not know the firms’ equilibrium prices,   p
* (c), and
have to search to learn them. In our model consumers know 
  
c p,cv( ). Thus, the first 2 assumptions ensure that
meaningful search occurs. Alternatively, consumers could not know 
  
c p,cv( ). This would mean developing a more
complicated incomplete information game. If when there are virtual shops, we allow new consumers to choose
weather to canvass prices through the Web, the Competing Equilibrium becomes non-generic, unless we also make
new consumers heterogeneous with respect to, e.g., d , which has an expository cost. Finally, although these
assumptions are intended to ensure meaningful search in a simple setting, they are not without justification, since as
we argue in footnotes 9 and 10, some consumers in some markets behave similarly.
7 Information Goods
In this section we discuss the price equilibria for the case where d = 0 . We argue that for this case, virtual
shops’ prices may be higher than the physical shop’s price.
Restriction, 0 < Ds < d , potentially rules out information goods, for which d  is small, possibly zero. So
assume d = 0 . From (1), 
  
Rp
an ao (p t ,s ,Ds ,d ) < p t ,   t= vn,vo . Lemma 2: (ii) and (iii) holds.
Equilibrium prices are as in section 3, with an important difference. When 
  
a = 1,0( ) and     p os < r p , or   a = 1,1( )
and 
   p m
s
< rp , if 0 < Ds < d ,    p t
*
=
) 
p v < rp = p p
* , whereas if d = 0 ,    p p
*
= r p <
) 
p v = p t
* ,   t= vn,vo . If buying from a
virtual shop is more convenient than buying from a physical shop, the physical shop must charge a lower price than
virtual shops to sell to new consumers.
Case d = 0  illustrates an intuitive point. Functionally identical goods sold through different retailing
technologies, acquire different attributes. E-commerce reduces prices through the Price Competition and Cost
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Reduction effects. If in addition consumers value negatively e-commerce’s attributes, relative to those of other
retailing technologies, consumers will only buy on-line if compensated by lower prices, which pushes prices further
down. If however, consumers value positively e-commerce’s attributes, they will pay for the convenience of buying
on-line, and the net effect can be such that prices are higher on-line than off-line.
8 Related Literature
This section inserts the paper on the literature. Our paper relates to 3 literature branches. First, to the e-
commerce marketing literature: Alba, Lynch, Weitz, Janiszewski, Lutz, Sawyer & Wood (1997), Bakos (1997), Lal
& Sarvary (1998), Peterson, Balasubramanian, & Bronnenberg, (1997), Zettelmeyer (1997). Bakos (1997) presents
a model of circular product differentiation, where consumers search for prices and product characteristics, i.e.,
locations. All consumers have Internet access. If search costs for price and product information are separated, and if
e-commerce lowers the former, prices decrease; if it lowers the latter, prices can increase.
Second, our paper relates to the literature that analyzes competition between alternative retailing
technologies: Balasubramanian (1998), Bouckaert (2000), Friberg, Ganslandt & Sandstrom (2000), Michael (1994),
and Legros & Stahl (2000). Balasubramanian (1998) and Bouckaert (2000) use a model of circular product
differentiation to analyze competition between catalogue and physical shop retailing. Physical shops are located on
the circumference, and catalogue firms at the center of the circle. The presence of a catalogue firm lowers prices,
and the number of physical shops in the market.
Third, our paper relates to the advertising and markets for information literatures: Baye & Morgan (1998),
Caillaud & Jullien (2000), Ellison & Ellison (2001), Iyer & Pazgal (2000), and Kephart & Greenwald (1999). Baye &
Morgan (1998) examine the interaction between markets for information and the product market they serve. They
show that the product market can exhibits price dispersion even if consumers are fully informed. Kephart &
Greenwald (1999) investigate the impact of shopbots on markets. Shopbots allow users to choose the number of
searches, and make search cost depend only weakly on the number of searches, i.e., nonlinear, leading to a more
extensive search.
In two companion papers (Mazón & Pereira 2001a, 2001b) we .
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